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ARTICLES 
ILLIQUIDITY AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Alessio M. Pacces* 
ABSTRACT 
This article analyzes the determinants of liquidity crises based on the 
dynamics of banking and finance under Knightian uncertainty. In this perspective, 
the facts of the global financial crisis seem to confirm Minsky’s hypothesis of 
endogenous financial instability derived from Keynes’s theory of liquidity and 
expectations. Conventional expectations allow overcoming uncertainty via the 
liquidity of secondary markets and, in turn, of banks’ liabilities that are accepted as 
money. However, the failure of existing conventions drives the system into 
uncertainty-driven liquidity spirals, which are the more dangerous the more private 
money financial intermediaries have managed to create in the first place. Despite 
limited availability of data that can proxy for Knightian uncertainty, this approach 
to liquidity problems may explain better than others how a relatively small shock, 
such as the default of U.S. subprime mortgages, could trigger a worldwide systemic 
crisis. 
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The policy implications of this understanding of illiquidity are twofold. First, 
financial crises should be policed by tailoring the lender of last resort function of 
central banks to the creation of private money. By the same token, banking should 
be defined and regulated according to this monetary function performed by 
financial intermediaries, whether banks or non-banks. These institutions should 
face payout restrictions while being prevented from using retained earnings to 
increase the quantity of private money they can create through their balance sheet. 
Second, the corporate governance of banks should allow insulating managers 
and controlling shareholders from the short-termism of stock markets. Inasmuch as 
myopic stock markets influence the balance sheet choices of bankers, investor-
friendly corporate governance is a major amplifier of liquidity crises. This article 
thus suggests combining long-term remuneration with the possibility for bank 
managers to claim a compensation for parting with control. Similar implications are 
derived for controlling shareholders. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Liquidity” is a recurrent expression in the scientific and the policy debate on 
the financial crisis.1 There is a broad understanding that only a combination of 
factors can explain turmoil of the proportions we experienced in the years 2007–
2009—and that, albeit for different reasons, we are still experiencing with the 
current sovereign debt crisis in Europe.2 Whatever opinion one may have on the 
leading cause of financial crises, the drying up of liquidity is generally considered a 
key part of the story.3 This matches our instinctive reaction to situations of 
financial turmoil, which is keeping (or making) our positions “liquid” whatever that 
means. A comprehensive theory of liquidity would then be most useful to 
understand financial crises, particularly what can make these so disastrous for a 
national and the global economy, and to devise policies aimed at containing 
illiquidity. Unfortunately, such a theory is very difficult to reconcile with 
mainstream economics.4 
This article seeks to make a little progress in the study of liquidity by 
departing from asymmetric information problems, which normally plague financial 
markets, and pointing instead at how financial decision-making deals with 
uncertainty about the future, which may result in a financial crisis. To keep matters 
simple, I define finance as a transfer of resources to the future and uncertainty as 
lack of precise knowledge on what this future will look like. Rational actors, 
including professional investors, routinely take financial decisions under 
uncertainty about contingencies that will affect their payoffs. Uncertainty differs 
from risk because it is immeasurable, that is, it concerns situations that cannot be 
                                                          
 
1 See, e.g., Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy 
Response, Speech at the Russell Sage Foundation and The Century Foundation Conference on 
“Rethinking Finance” (Apr. 13, 2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
bernanke20120413a.htm. 
2 Although the similarities of the current situation in Europe with some aspects of the global financial 
crisis will be emphasized at various junctures, this article does not deal with the sovereign debt crisis of 
the Eurozone. See Benoît Cœuré, Global Liquidity and Risk Appetite: A Re-Interpretation of the Recent 
Crises, Speech at the BIS-ECB Workshop on Global Liquidity and Its International Repercussions 
(Feb. 6, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120206.en.html. 
3 RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO 
DEPRESSION 1 passim (2009). 
4 For a state-of-the-art discussion of liquidity problems stemming from asymmetric information, see 
Jean Tirole, Illiquidity and All Its Friends, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 287 (2011); BENGT HOLMSTRÖM & JEAN 
TIROLE, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE LIQUIDITY (2011) (providing a thorough, technical discussion of the 
topic). 
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assigned a probability.5 The question is, then, how is rational finance possible in 
the presence of uncertainty? 
According to Keynes,6 actors deal with uncertainty as if they were dealing 
with measurable risks based on “conventions” about the likelihood of future 
contingencies. These conventions provide rational economic actors with a sense of 
safety because the conventions allow trading assets, no matter with which maturity, 
for certain amounts of cash. Liquidity of this kind is compromised when the 
unfolding of events denies reliability to the underlying conventions, for instance 
because adverse contingencies that had been conventionally disregarded actually 
occur and nobody knows how to price the risk that they occur again. Actors then 
seek to disengage from the future until new conventions are developed that allow 
dealing with the new state of the world. People avoid committing to an uncertain 
future by demanding more liquidity than could be obtained on secondary markets 
for debt, which in the extreme means cash. As a result, the price of other financial 
assets—including those previously considered “safe”—plummet relative to cash 
and cash-equivalents, interest rates rise, and a financial crisis may ensue. 
This Keynesian perspective on liquidity problems is often overlooked in 
contemporary economics. This article revisits this approach with a double purpose. 
The first goal is to apply the above understandings of liquidity to the global 
financial crisis, particularly to the unfolding of events in the United States between 
2007 and 2009.7 It will be shown that the circumstances having the largest 
quantitative impact on the crisis—most prominently the liquidity premiums and the 
so called “haircuts” on private debt8—are hard to explain based on standard models 
of asymmetric information. Whereas, the liquidity premiums fit an uncertainty 
dynamic, implying, if anything, symmetric ignorance. After validating the link 
between uncertainty and liquidity problems, the next goal will be to derive policy 
implications from this approach. 
                                                          
 
5 The distinction between risk and uncertainty along these lines was originally developed by economist 
Frank H. Knight. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). 
6 JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 96–106 (reprint 
2008) (1936). 
7 For a careful illustration of these events, see Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and 
Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 82–91 (2009) and GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY 
THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 148–52 (2010). 
8 Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Haircuts, 92 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 507, 508 (2010) 
(defining the industry term “haircut”). 
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Embedded in the notion of liquidity, however elusive, is the idea of a 
systemic externality:9 lending cash allows a capitalist economy to flourish; 
hoarding cash may make it collapse. If the presence of externalities implies that 
public intervention could improve welfare, the claim that liquidity (and thus its 
externalities) ultimately depends on uncertainty may cast doubts on the ability of 
regulation to control the generation of liquidity and its contraction. Yet, even 
without crediting policymakers with superior forecasting skills, authoritative 
economists and legal scholars increasingly advocate the study of uncertainty for 
better understanding economics and how to police it for the good of society.10 
In order to investigate the implications of uncertainty for liquidity and its 
regulation, this article will focus on just two aspects of the recent financial crisis. 
These are banking and its corporate governance. The reason is that banking is the 
ultimate source of liquidity, due to its ability to finance long-term projects issuing 
short-term liabilities that are accepted as money. The incentive for banks to engage 
in this process, known as maturity transformation,11 is profit measured as returns to 
equity. Most corporate governance decisions are based on these returns. The 
problem is that both banking and its corporate governance may be not in line with 
the interest of society when it comes to liquidity. Liquidity generation in the form 
of monetary liabilities may be either excessive or insufficient, particularly in the 
presence of swings in uncertainty. 
Because liquidity allows financing valuable projects by overcoming 
uncertainty about the future, it is not intuitive how there could be too much of it. 
However, today’s liquidity enables financial institutions to profit from increasing 
leverage, which magnifies the impact of tomorrow’s illiquidity not only on 
individual institutions, but also on the solvency of the entire financial system.12 
Banks can issue virtually unlimited amounts of short-term liabilities when liquid, 
                                                          
 
9 See Dirk Heremans & Alessio M. Pacces, Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets, in 
REGULATION AND ECONOMICS 558, 571–75 (Roger J. Van den Bergh & Alessio M. Pacces eds., 2012). 
10 See, e.g., Ricardo J. Caballero, Macroeconomics After the Crisis: Time to Deal with the Pretense-of-
Knowledge Syndrome, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 94–98 (2010); Richard A. Posner, On the Receipt of the 
Ronald H. Coase Medal: Uncertainty, the Economic Crisis, and the Future of Law and Economics, 12 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 265, 272–79 (2010). 
11 Alessio M. Pacces, Consequences of Uncertainty for Regulation: Law and Economics of the Financial 
Crisis, 7 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 479, 485 (2010). 
12 Tobias Adrian & Hyun S. Shin, The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and the Financial 
Crisis of 2007–2009, 2 ANN. REV. ECON. 603, 607 (2010) (illustrating the dynamic interaction between 
liquidity and leverage, which are mutually reinforcing both in upturns and downturns). 
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albeit long-term assets back them up. Call this collateral. Sudden illiquidity of 
collateral, for instance AAA bonds, cast doubts on every bank’s ability to keep 
promises to deliver cash on demand. But the severity of the problem depends on 
how much leverage was enabled in the first place. Because assets may be 
collateralized more than once and the same collateral may guarantee multiple 
liabilities,13 liquidity and leverage are two mutually reinforcing factors of systemic 
instability. Maturity transformation is central to this process. Therefore, this article 
will focus on banking neglecting other important determinants of liquidity prior to 
the recent crisis, such as ratings of structured debt of and the savings glut from 
emerging markets.14 
Banking, and not banks, is the focus because especially securitization of 
financial assets allows other financial intermediaries to engage in maturity 
transformation (so-called “shadow banking”).15 Banking continuously evolves to 
capture profit opportunities from maturity transformation and in doing so, 
unavoidably injects new uncertainty in the system. We fully realize how banking 
has evolved only in hindsight; we do not know how banking will evolve in the 
future. Hence, we must live with unpredictable financial crises unless maturity 
transformation is to be prohibited altogether. However, such a prohibition would 
increase considerably and perhaps inefficiently the amount of “dead capital” 
unavailable for financing long-term investments.16 
If we cannot eliminate uncertainty, regulation can still contain its adverse 
consequences on liquidity and financial instability. In order to discipline maturity 
transformation, banking should be defined functionally with respect to the 
liabilities that certain intermediaries manage to get accepted as money. This 
definition is broader than what is currently known as “shadow banking.” The 
purpose of defining banking functionally is to constrain the endogenous growth of 
                                                          
 
13 In other words, collateral can be “rehypothecated.” Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating 
the Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 261, 277 (2010). 
14 I have dealt more broadly with other factors contributing to the global financial crisis—including 
rating agencies. See Alessio M. Pacces, Uncertainty and the Financial Crisis, 29 J. FIN. 
TRANSFORMATION 79 (2010). 
15 Gorton & Metrick, supra note 13, at 261–68. 
16 MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET & JEAN TIROLE, BALANCING THE BANKS: GLOBAL 
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 53 (2010). See also Ricardo J. Caballero & Pablo D. Kurlat, The 
“Surprising” Origin and Nature of Financial Crises: A Macroeconomic Policy Proposal 20 (MIT 
Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 09-24, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1473918. 
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the balance sheet of whatever financial intermediary promises to deliver cash on 
demand. This regulatory strategy may contain the explosion of liquidity in good 
times, but cannot stop its contraction when uncertainty kicks in. To this purpose, 
central banks must be committed to back up privately created money. Central 
banks have been doing this since their inception, but historically, only the 
commitment to do so ex-ante has prevented systemic crises.17 This public 
insurance, which is reminiscent of deposit insurance although it would be 
implemented as lending of last resort, should be crafted in such a way as to set a 
credible floor to collateral values without fueling moral hazard of institutions 
levering on that collateral. 
If financial intermediation must rely so much on public intervention in order 
to avoid systemic externalities, the question arises whether its corporate 
governance should be regulated too. Following mainstream theory, namely the 
principal-agent model of the management/shareholders relationship and the rational 
expectations approach to stock prices,18 it is not obvious why this should be the 
case. This theory predicts that if banking is regulated as to internalize systemic 
externalities, shareholders bear through stock prices the effects of risk-taking on 
social welfare and thus they will align managers’ incentives with the interest of 
society.19 
Mainstream financial economics, however, does not account for liquidity 
crises. Although the impact of corporate governance on the recent financial crisis is 
ambiguous both theoretically and empirically,20 the uncertainty perspective 
indicates at least one potential channel influencing banks’ propensity to hoard or to 
                                                          
 
17 GORTON, supra note 7, at 28–38. 
18 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (discussing principal-agent theory); Eugene 
F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) 
(discussing the rational expectations model). 
19 See Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig & Paul C. Pfleiderer, Fallacies, Irrelevant 
Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive (Rock Ctr. 
for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 86, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1669704. 
20 See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 653 (2010) (arguing on a number of grounds that empowering shareholders in corporate 
governance may increase financial instability if stock markets cannot be trusted to be efficient at any 
point in time); Andrea Beltratti & René M. Stulz, The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some 
Banks Perform Better?, 105 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2012) (finding that the banks with better corporate 
governance, as this is commonly understood, performed worse in the global financial crisis). 
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lend cash differently from what would be optimal for the society. This is, as 
Keynes noted,21 the liquidity of stock markets. The liquidity of stock markets can 
induce managers and, perhaps surprisingly, controlling shareholders to cater to the 
short-termism of professional investors both when they demand excessive returns 
(underestimating uncertainty) and when they discount returns by excessive 
liquidity premiums (overestimating uncertainty). Thus, the corporate governance of 
banks should be insulated from stock market pressures not only by mandating 
longer-term managerial remuneration, but also by allowing management tenure and 
exit at a premium by controlling persons/shareholders. 
II. LIQUIDITY, UNCERTAINTY AND FINANCE 
There is no universal definition of liquidity.22 The characterization of 
financial assets as more or less liquid varies with the times. The notion of liquidity 
is clear in at least one respect: it points to the ability to transform a given asset into 
cash. There are basically two ways to perform this transformation: one is to sell the 
asset on a secondary market; the other is to raise funds posting the asset as 
collateral. These two ways are known in the literature as “market liquidity” and 
“funding liquidity,” respectively.23 These methods to obtain liquidity are also well 
known to laypeople when they face an unexpected need of cash: either they go sell 
their assets or they put them in pawn. 
Let us consider a person holding a certain asset to illustrate why she may 
choose to hoard cash instead. This person may fear three things:1) an unexpected 
reduction of cash flow; 2) that the asset may fetch less than it is worth if sold 
abruptly in the market; or 3) that borrowing against the asset is constrained by a 
margin or “haircut” imposed by the lender on the market value of the asset, perhaps 
because the lender shares the borrower’s fears on market resilience. While the last 
two circumstances correspond with the market liquidity and the funding liquidity 
described above, the first is something else. It is the rationale of precautionary 
demand for money illustrated in Keynes’s General Theory.24 
                                                          
 
21 KEYNES, supra note 6, at 98. 
22 Finance scholars carefully avoid engaging in definitions. See HOLMSTRÖM & TIROLE, supra note 4, at 
7. 
23 Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity, 22 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 2201, 2202–05 (2009). 
24 KEYNES, supra note 6, at 107–09. 
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The precautionary motive to hold money plays a key role in Keynes’s 
“liquidity preference”; although this role is less studied than the reaction of interest 
rates to open market operations.25 As Keynes subsequently clarified, people’s 
desire to hold idle balances of money is “a barometer of the degree of our distrust 
of our calculations and conventions concerning the future.”26 In other words, the 
precautionary demand of money depends on uncertainty. According to Keynes, 
uncertainty is the ultimate reason why people want liquidity, i.e. decide to hold 
money as a “store of wealth” in the face of alternatives yielding interest, utility or 
profit. 
In the spirit of Knight,27 Keynes argues that most future contingencies in the 
real world are inherently uncertain because they cannot be assigned a probability. 
The interesting question, however, is how individuals overcome uncertainty. In a 
capitalist economy, people must make decisions on whether to accumulate wealth 
for the future (or to borrow against expectations of future wealth) with only a very 
vague idea on what the future will hold. Investors are willing to take these risks, 
because they rely on a convention implicitly agreed upon with the other members 
of society. Conventional judgments under uncertain knowledge are based on the 
assumption that “the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely.”28 This 
allows drawing probabilities on future events based on the distributions of similar 
events observed in the past. In this way, investors feel that they are acting 
rationally, which relieves them from anxiety, by following the conventional 
wisdom. 
Real-life decisions by economic actors rely heavily on such conventions. For 
the purpose of this inquiry, ratings of debt are a case in point. But, it is worth 
noting that any standard supporting probability distributions about uncertain events 
(e.g. illness or unemployment) works in the same way. So long as the underlying 
convention holds, the future is handled as a collection of manageable risks, and the 
residual uncertainty is basically disregarded. In this situation, the demand of idle 
                                                          
 
25 The modern understanding of Keynes’s thought is mediated by the synthesis made by Professor 
Hicks. John R. Hicks, Mr. Keynes and the “Classics;” A Suggested Interpretation, 5 ECONOMETRICA 
147 (1937). Many of the insights by Keynes—including those discussed in this article—were not 
included in the Hick’s model (known as IS-LM model) because they could not be formalized. 
26 John M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 51 Q.J. ECON. 209, 216 (1937). 
27 KNIGHT, supra note 5. 
28 KEYNES, supra note 6, at 152. 
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money is reduced, both because the future looks predictable, and because interest-
bearing assets can be transformed into cash at a low cost if needed. 
Conventions that allow the future to be treated and contracted upon as a set of 
probability distributions have an important downside: they are fragile. When the 
world turns out to be different from what it was expected to be (e.g. because of A-
Influenza or an unexpected recession), the convention supporting the previous view 
of the world may be no longer recognized. Conventions may fail instantly, but they 
are never instantly replaced. While people are busy redoing their calculations on 
how to handle the future in probabilistic terms, they are facing bare Knightian 
uncertainty. The most rational strategy in this circumstance is to disengage from 
the future assuming that it will be as bad as it can be. Whenever economic actors 
are unable to overcome uncertainty in a conventional manner, they “prefer” 
liquidity to satisfy their want of safety.29 
The consequences of liquidity preference for finance are manifest. First, 
financial assets must offer a “liquidity premium” for parting with cash. The size of 
this premium varies with the levels of perceived uncertainty.30 People’s propensity 
to hoard cash and the interest rate of illiquid assets are higher the larger the 
uncertainty; inversely, people’s propensity to invest or lend and the price of illiquid 
assets will be lower during times of great uncertainty. Liquidity premiums are a 
major cause of unemployment in Keynesian economics.31 Second, in order to keep 
liquidity premiums low, we need to accept short-termism of secondary markets and 
the persistence of disequilibrium that this involves. The problem with such 
operation of secondary markets is that prices of debt and equity tend to drop 
exactly when liquidity premiums rise and vice-versa, thereby perpetuating the 
slumps and the booms triggered by uncertainty and disregard thereof. The third 
consequence of liquidity preference is the existence of banking as provider of 
stores of wealth, which in turn depends on financial intermediaries’ credible 
commitments to exchange their liabilities for cash. This implication, absent from 
Keynes’s framework, was developed by his acolyte Hyman Minsky.32 
                                                          
 
29 Keynes, supra note 26, at 217. 
30 Jochen Runde has developed this insight at length. See Jochen Runde, Keynesian Uncertainty and 
Liquidity Preference, 18 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 129 (1994). 
31 Keynes, supra note 26, at 221. 
32 HYMAN P. MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 115–27 (reprint 2008) (1975). 
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Minsky’s work has been widely cited in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis,33 mainly because his financial instability hypothesis seemed to be confirmed 
by the recent events. Minsky contended that the finance of capitalist economies 
endogenously evolves towards financial crises. According to Minsky,34 there are 
three models of asset financing. These are, in order of robustness: 1) Hedge 
finance: the expected cash flow from the asset matches the repayment schedule of 
debt; 2) Speculative finance: the expected cash flow is sufficient to repay debt 
interests, not the principal (which needs be refinanced); 3) Ponzi finance: the 
expected cash flow is insufficient to repay interests, so debt must increase. In spite 
of uncertainty, capitalism proceeds under the Keynesian assumption that the 
current state of affairs will continue indefinitely, which in turn validates a gradual 
move from hedge, to speculative and later to Ponzi finance until a debt crisis occur. 
This crisis will develop when there is some difficulty refinancing existing debt. 
This inability to refinance will bring uncertainty to the forefront, raise interest rates, 
make refinancing more difficult, and so forth. 
The gist of Minsky’s thought, however, is the role of banks in the above 
process. Banks—or more precisely “banking” as Minsky himself clarified—are 
specialized “merchants of debt.”35 They profit from accepting private debt of 
different maturities and “selling” it as monetary liabilities. Maturity transformation 
makes banks the quintessence of speculative finance: banks fund long-term debt by 
rolling over short-term liabilities. Banking substitutes profits from maturity 
transformation to liquidity premiums. This substitution is in principle efficient 
because, by activating savings at lower interest rates than secondary markets, it 
allows more, potentially valuable investments to be financed. Yet this circumstance 
incentivizes banks to satisfy any demand of financing, possibly according to the 
Ponzi model, by increasing the size of their balance sheet. This is possible to the 
extent that larger amounts of liquid liabilities can be issued given the bank’s equity, 
cash reserves, and assets cash flows—what Minsky called “margins of safety.”36 
Decreasing margins of safety depend not only on borrowers’ and investors’ 
confidence in liquidity, but also on bank shareholders’ quest for profits via higher 
leverage. According to Minsky, the combination of leverage and liquidity is the 
                                                          
 
33 See NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS—A CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF 
FINANCE 88 (2010). 
34 HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 231–32 (reprint 2008) (1986). 
35 Id. at 229. 
36 Id. at 238. 
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reason why banking, which is otherwise necessary to overcome uncertainty in a 
capitalist economy, is an endogenous destabilizer of the system.37 Banks may 
generate liquidity by increasing leverage so long as their assets are good collateral 
for cash promises. This mechanism works on the condition that there is no 
perceived uncertainty on debt values. Uncertainty determines a shortage of 
collateral for short-term promises, both because liquidity premiums rise (asset 
prices fall) and because the supply of stores of wealth shrinks. Banking contributes 
to the severity of financial crises via its monetary liabilities. In conditions of 
illiquidity, these liabilities become more unsustainable the higher the leverage they 
have enabled in the first place. 
The relevance of Minsky’s theory for the global financial crisis is contentious, 
particularly because his framework did not explicitly account for securitization and 
for the absence of any margin of safety in subprime mortgages.38 Similarly, 
Minsky’s advocacy of a Big Government to support financial stability seems 
difficult to reconcile with the current sovereign debt crisis in Europe. However, 
Minsky’s analysis is prescient in a subtler sense. Two factors affecting the severity 
of the global financial crisis were clearly identified by Minsky; they are being only 
recently investigated by the economic literature. One is the instability of stores of 
wealth, equivalently called “collateral” or “liquidity.”39 This instability may 
suddenly lead to so-called “flights to quality,”40 which are the modern version of 
bank runs. Another factor first identified by Minsky is the endogeneity of liquidity 
to a “leverage cycle.”41 In what follows, I will illustrate how these phenomena 
interact dramatically with uncertainty and why they need to be addressed by both 
financial regulation and monetary policy. 
                                                          
 
37 This insight matches the more recent theory by Adrian and Shin. Adrian & Shin, supra note 12, at 
607–11. 
38 Jan Kregel, Using Minsky’s Cushions of Safety to Analyze the Crisis in the U.S. Subprime Mortgage 
Market, 37 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 3 (2008). 
39 HOLMSTRÖM & TIROLE, supra note 4, at 7. 
40 Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Collective Risk Management in a Flight to Quality 
Episode, 63 J. FIN. 2195 (2008).  
41 John Geanakoplos, Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leverage Cycle, FED. RES. BANK 
N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 101 (2010). See also Adrian & Shin, supra note 12. 
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III. UNCERTAINTY AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
A. What the Global Financial Crisis Was Not 
The “easy” explanations of the global financial crisis were short-lived. 
Originally, much of the blame was put on the originate-to-distribute model of 
securitization.42 This model seemed to explain why extremely weak loans, like 
subprime and Alt-A mortgages, could be originated knowing in advance that they 
could only be repaid out of refinancing (that is, only if housing prices kept rising 
indefinitely). Allegedly, the reason was that the originating bank or bank affiliate 
did not retain sufficient, if any interest in the loans, as these were securitized and 
immediately sold to other investors. Short of the obvious question, why investors 
bought that stuff on these terms, we now know that the banks did not entirely divest 
the assets originated in this fashion.43 They warehoused or otherwise repurchased 
big chunks of these securities directly or through off-balance-sheet vehicles. After 
the collapse of the market for asset-backed commercial paper at the beginning of 
the crisis, banks were forced to take back the Special Purpose Vehicles on their 
balance sheet because of implicit or explicit commitments to redeem the vehicles’ 
paper.44 As one commentator put it, this model of securitization is better 
characterized as “originate and pretend to distribute.”45 
Another popular explanation of a similar tenor is moral hazard.46 Banks 
engage in very risky lending practices because they anticipate that the government 
and the monetary authority will bail them out should anything go wrong. The moral 
hazard problem is indeed inherent in contemporary banking. Because the 
government wants to prevent a systemic crisis, banks are protected by a safety net, 
                                                          
 
42 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373 (2008) (pointing at the excesses in the mortgage market as a major 
cause of the financial crisis); Martin F. Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of 
the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis, 157 DE ECONOMIST 129 (2009) (emphasizing, however, that 
the downturn of the mortgage markets can only result in systemic instability in the presence of moral 
hazard by banks); Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioral Finance and Financial 
Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 23 (2009) (arguing that subprime 
mortgages could feed the growth of securitization because of behavioral biases in decision-making). 
43 Augusto de la Torre & Alain Ize, Regulatory Reform: Integrating Paradigms, 13 INT’L FIN. 109, 120 
(2010). 
44 Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 10, 41 (2009). 
45 CHARLES A.E. GOODHART, THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 54 (2009) 
(emphasis in the original). 
46 See Charles W. Calomiris, Financial Innovation, Regulation, and Reform, 29 CATO J. 65 (2009). 
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which, in turn, reduces the bank creditors’ incentives to monitor.47 This 
interpretation is seemingly supported by the massive interventions of governments 
and central banks to prevent the banking system from collapsing in various parts of 
the world. However, it neglects two factors. 
First, the global crisis started in the form of bank runs in wholesale debt 
markets.48 While the safety net has made traditional bank runs by depositors nearly 
obsolete, it did not address the wholesale market where most of the securitized 
banking (so-called “shadow banking”) was carried out.49 Short of their disruptive 
consequences on the financial system, bank runs are a genuine instance of market 
discipline, which naturally rules out moral hazard.50 Second and related, banks and 
their financiers had no reason to expect the government to rescue distressed 
financial institutions before it became clear that this was the only way out of the 
crisis. In other words, in addition to the uncertainty as to whether private debt 
commitments could be honored, there was uncertainty as to which of these 
commitments, if any, would have been publicly supported. This uncertainty peaked 
with the failure of Lehman Brothers and it started to get resolved only when 
governments and central banks across the globe could credibly commit not to let 
this happen again.51 
The bottom line is that moral hazard is very unlikely to have played a decisive 
role in the buildup of the global crisis. However, it may well be that moral hazard 
becomes a serious problem for the stability of financial intermediation once the 
turmoil is brought to an end, possibly with a credible public backstop.52 I will 
discuss the role of moral hazard in shaping regulation in Section 4. 
                                                          
 
47 Heremans & Pacces, supra note 9, at 570. 
48 Gorton, supra note 44, at 34. 
49 GORTON, supra note 7, at 45–52. 
50 de la Torre & Ize, supra note 43, at 131. 
51 Uncertainty was recently back on stage because the European Central Bank did not initially commit to 
supporting the sovereign debt of the Eurozone (and the banks holding it). See Paul De Grauwe, Why the 
ECB Refuses to be Lender of Last Resort, VOX (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.voxeu.org/article/why-ecb-
refuses-be-lender-last-resort. However, the European Central Bank recently announced that it will act as 
a backstop beginning in 2013. ECB’s Mario Draghi Unveils Bond-Buying Euro Debt Plan, BBC NEWS 
(Sept. 6, 2012, 2:04 p.m. ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19499950. 
52 See GOODHART, supra note 45, at 93–99 (discussing the right timing for regulators to worry about 
moral hazard). 
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Dismissal of the easy explanations helps focus the analysis on the heart of the 
matter. The global financial crisis was essentially a banking crisis depending on the 
inability of financial intermediaries (banks and non-banks) to maintain funding of 
their long-term investments. As is typical in banking, this funding was short-term 
and susceptible of runs. The new feature of shadow banking, as opposed to 
traditional banking, is that this funding comes from wholesale investors.53 Because 
the “deposits” of the latter are not insured, most of this funding is collateralized. 
Herein lies the importance of securitization: a bank’s incentive to generate 
securities out of its loans depends on the securities’ being eligible as collateral for 
short-term funding. This securitization is a way to extract additional profits from 
maturity transformation, which adds up substantially to the revenues from just 
originating and distributing the securities.54 That said, in the absence of moral 
hazard, banks should be cautious in the maintenance of their funding, which in turn 
depends on the perceived quality of the collateral. The difficult question is how the 
quality of collateral could suddenly deteriorate, fail to support banks’ funding, and 
result in a systemic crisis. 
This question does not have an easy answer. According to the Minsky 
framework adopted in this article, this outcome is to be expected as the financing 
pattern of an economy moving towards Ponzi finance.55 At some point, the default 
of some intermediaries will trigger the fear that refinancing is not sustainable, 
determining massive withdrawals from the banking system and the collapse of 
asset prices. This explanation matches intuitively the dynamics of the global 
financial crisis, but it must be reconciled with its facts. 
A good account of the financial crisis needs to explain two puzzling 
circumstances. First, it is widely held that the plummeting of securities backed by 
subprime mortgages was the major determinant of the crisis. The problem is that 
the business of subprime mortgage securitization was not large enough. 
Outstanding subprime-related Mortgage Backed Securities were some $1.2 trillion, 
                                                          
 
53 Gary B. Gorton, Questions and Answers About the Financial Crisis (Yale Sch. of Mgmt. and Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15787, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1557279. 
54 There are two ways to look at this, which are not incompatible. According to Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert W. Vishny, Unstable Banking, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 306 (2010), banks profit from origination fees 
by fully leveraging their balance sheet to securitization. According to Gorton, supra note 53, banks 
profit from the earning spread between their securitized assets and collateralized borrowing against 
them. 
55 See supra text accompanying notes 34–35. 
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about 80% of which were rated AAA.56 Even assuming that all underlying 
mortgages defaulted, the expected losses should have been contained to a few 
billion dollars (say, 30% of the outstanding amount) under the worst-case scenario 
of U.S.-wide housing prices collapse.57 The actual losses have turned out to be 
much lower and, apparently, they have hardly affected the AAA tranches.58 But, 
the crucial point is that subprime-related securities alone did not have systemic 
relevance. 
The second puzzle is the timing of the crisis. Figure 1 reports an index on a 
synthetic credit default swap (ABX-CDS) measuring subprime risk as price of 
different tranches of subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBS). When we look 
at the most sensitive investment grade tranches (those rated BBB), the graph shows 
that the subprime fundamentals started deteriorating already at the end of 2006. 
However, the financial crisis began only a few months later, namely in August 
2007, when investors started to withdraw funds from some hedge funds and from 
the banks’ investment vehicles. The important events that followed have been 
entirely unrelated with the pricing of subprime risk by the ABX index.59 How can 
these circumstances be reconciled with the standard narrative, according to which 
that was mainly a “subprime crisis”?60 
                                                          
 
56 Gorton, supra note 53. 
57 Hellwig, supra note 42, at 131.  
58 Gorton, supra note 53.  
59 Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425 
(2012). 
60 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 42. 
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Figure 1 
Source: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT (April & October 
2008; April & October 2009; April 2010). 
The crisis was not merely a problem of subprime mortgage securitization. 
This is evident by looking at the IMF estimates of the impact of the crisis on U.S. 
banks’ losses reported in Figure 2. Already less than one year after the beginning of 
the crisis, banks suffered realized or expected losses on classes of assets that were 
unrelated either to mortgages, to securities, or to both. These components only 
become larger in the following estimates and, when the “subprime panic” comes to 
an end, they are the largest source of banks’ losses. It is also noteworthy that the 
losses on MBS at the peak of the crisis vastly exceeded the worst-case scenario 
projections on subprime securities;61 this is partly because at some point the price 
of prime MBS (which should have been minimally affected even by a severe 
downturn in the housing market) plummeted too.62 
These data show mainly two things. First, the most severe and persisting 
effects of the crisis were on the real economy. The banking crisis determined a 
recession which, in turn, increased the defaults on banks’ traditional loans. The 
second and more relevant point for the analysis of the crisis is that the losses on 
                                                          
 
61 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 56–58. See also Hellwig, supra note 42, at 130–31. 
62 See Figure 1, supra. 
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securities affected classes of assets bearing no immediate relation with subprime 
mortgages. In addition, the losses on both mortgage-related and mortgage-unrelated 
securities were overstated by market prices during the panic.63 
Figure 2 
Source: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT (October 2008). 
In order to understand this outcome, we need to take a closer look at the crisis 
events. What happened on August 9, 2007, when financial markets worldwide 
where hit by the first wave of panic?64 The short answer is nothing special. There 
was no “new” information from the U.S. housing market regarding the price of 
subprime risk. To be sure, subprime risk had started to affect the price of AAA 
tranches of MBS a few weeks before (see Figure 1). This is puzzling because the 
junior BBB tranches had not yet lost enough of their value to justify that result. 
Anyway, that was not news on August 9. That day, the only news was that BNP 
Paribas froze redemption of three of its funds heavily invested in subprime 
                                                          
 
63 The IMF estimates across 2008–2010 are based on different methodologies, but they all rely on 
marking-to-market of banks’ assets. Compare INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
STABILITY REPORT: CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS (2008), 
with INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: RESPONDING TO THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND MEASURING SYSTEMIC RISK (2009). 
64 GOODHART, supra note 45, at 1. 
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securities, declaring its inability to value structured financial products.65 Differently 
from the downturn of the housing market and the falling price of subprime 
securities—both of which were already anticipated—the action taken by BNP 
Paribas was a surprise.66 For the first time, a bank declared inability to make good 
on a promise to deliver cash against debt issued under its explicit or implicit 
guarantee. 
The relevance of this circumstance may be questioned. In principle, a 
downturn in MBS prices can immediately affect the balance sheet of a financial 
intermediary by triggering a liquidity spiral.67 This can happen when the assets in 
question are bought on margins, that is, when they are simultaneously posted as 
collateral for short-term funding. In this context, given an initially small shock, 
asset prices may increasingly deviate from fundamentals because investors are so 
leveraged that they have no choice other than reducing their position in order to 
keep their equity margin constant. In a typical collateralized transaction, like a 
repurchase agreement (repo), this margin is called “haircut.” For example, buying a 
security on a 10% haircut means that the investor borrows $90 to purchase a 
security worth $100, which is simultaneously posted as collateral. The investor’s 
equity in the transaction is $10. If the investor has purchased $100 million in this 
way and the price of each security drops to, say, $95, half of the investor’s equity 
($5 million) is lost and—holding the haircut constant—she can only refinance $50 
million with the reminder. That implies selling assets worth $45 million in a market 
that already undervalues them. As many investors are in the same position, the 
initial price drop is magnified by these sales, which further reduce the price, induce 
additional liquidations, and so forth. 
This mechanism is known as fire sale, and it is the prevailing explanation of 
how the global financial crisis unfolded.68 Investors are forced to sell their assets in 
a slump because they have no alternative to maintain the haircut requested by their 
financiers. This process creates a serious risk of bankruptcy accompanying the 
downward spiral of the asset prices. Therefore, the financiers will also raise the 
haircuts in order to protect themselves from the risk that, because of falling prices, 
the collateral is worth less than their exposure when they need to sell the 
                                                          
 
65 GORTON, supra note 7, at 150. 
66 See Caballero & Kurlat, supra note 16. 
67 Brunnermeier, supra note 7, at 92–94. 
68 Id. at 91–92. See also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and 
Macroeconomics, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (2011). 
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securities.69 Raising haircuts exacerbate the downward spiral because this increases 
the pace of forced sales, up to the point in which the asset is no longer accepted as 
collateral or ceases to be traded altogether. 
If we follow this explanation, however, the theory does not fit the empirical 
data from the financial crisis. The fire sale process can only be so disruptive when 
the vast majority of investors are so leveraged that any slight decrease in the asset 
price triggers a general margin call. If a sufficient number of investors is not in this 
situation (i.e. they have extra equity so that the margin requirements are not 
immediately binding), not only can they avoid fire sales, but they should rather buy 
assets being dumped at prices below fundamentals. These investors are known as 
“natural buyers” and the arbitrage opportunities available to them make it very 
difficult to start a fire sale.70 The fact that arbitrage has not happened is not 
necessarily evidence that most U.S. investors were financially constrained when the 
subprime prices started to fall. Indeed, the data suggests quite the opposite.71 
Whether forced or not, financial intermediaries effectively reduced their 
aggregate positions in a number of securities. Thus, liquidity spirals actually 
occurred, and they concerned much more than subprime MBS. As Figure 3 shows, 
the spreads on both non-mortgage asset-backed securities (ABS) and on corporate 
bonds rose as of August 2007, which implies that they started trading at 
significantly less than par. These securities were all rated AAA but, differently 
from subprime securities, there was no reason why they should not be expected to 
deliver the promised cash flows. 
                                                          
 
69 Gorton & Metrick, supra note 8, at 511–13. 
70 On the notion of “natural buyer” see Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 68, at 36. 
71 This point was initially made by Gorton. See supra note 44, at 38–41. Other commentators have 
subsequently subscribed to this view. See, e.g., Arvind Krishnamurthy, How Debt Markets Have 
Malfunctioned in the Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2010) (presenting empirical evidence on failure of 
arbitrage mechanisms, even in the absence of financial constraints). See also Arvind Krishnamurthy, 
Amplification Mechanisms in Liquidity Crises, 2 AM. ECON. J.—MACROECON. 1 (2010) (discussing a 
theoretical model of uncertainty amplifying an initially small shock from a financially constrained 
institution). In addition, there is uncontested empirical evidence that particularly commercial banks in 
the US had not been using their balance sheet capacity throughout the crisis. Adrian & Shin, supra note 
12, at 612. See also Zhiguo He, In Gu Khang & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Balance Sheet Adjustments 
During the 2008 Crisis, 58 IMF ECON. REV. 118, 147–49 (2010). 
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Source: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT (April 2009 & 
April 2010). 
Note: Spreads on corporate bonds are against 10-year U.S. government bonds. ABS Spreads are against 
5-year swaps. LIBOR-OIS refers to 3-month maturities. 
The leverage story alone simply cannot explain the financial crisis. First, an 
event other than the mere subprime prices downturn (but somehow connected with 
it) must have started the motion. Second, this event must have had sufficient impact 
to make the haircut/margin constraint eventually binding on the vast majority of 
financial intermediaries, so as to trigger the liquidity spiral described above. Third, 
this event needs to justify net sales of subprime-unrelated classes of debt securities, 
which can explain their falling prices. The only possible event of this kind is a 
generalized withdrawal from the banking system, that is, a bank run or the fear 
thereof.72 
B. How Uncertainty Destroys Collateral (and Leads to a 
Liquidity Crisis) 
A series of bank runs actually happened after August 9, 2007,73 but they were 
initially small. Some hedge funds deeply invested in subprime securities 
                                                          
 
72 See Gorton, supra note 53; Krishnamurthy, Amplification Mechanisms in Liquidity Crises, supra note 
71. 
73 Brunnermeier, supra note 7, at 84–85. 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 
P A G E  |  4 0 4  |  V O L .  7 4  |  2 0 1 3  
 
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2013.260 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
immediately experienced a run by their investors and financiers, having to freeze 
redemption and to liquidate their positions at increasing losses; many of them 
eventually had to be shut down. If the banking sector had followed suit, this would 
have been a perfect example of liquidity spiral. But, particularly, U.S. investment 
banks did something different, at least initially. While a few banks were not 
sufficiently capitalized to bail out their off-balance-sheet vehicles, most banks 
could and did take them back.74 Doing this in conditions of financial distress, 
which is a sufficient condition for being caught in a liquidity spiral, would have 
been suicide. On the contrary, all the U.S. major banks managed to stay afloat for 
more than half a year (the first big bank failure—Bear Stearns—only occurred in 
March 2008). However, after the first wave of panic, the banks had a substantial 
part of their balance sheet invested in illiquid assets. This transfer from off-
balance-sheet vehicles is the connection with the falling subprime prices. 
Falling subprime prices did not mean much in and of themselves.75 They 
started to matter only when they affected the perceived liquidity of banks’ 
liabilities. Hence, the news that BNP Paribas froze redemption from two small 
hedge funds had more impact than the longstanding bad news from the U.S. 
housing markets. For the first time, some AAA securities could no longer be traded 
for a certain amount of cash. In the words of one commentator,76 this was “scary 
bad news”—news that is paradoxically uninformative because it makes the future 
look more uncertain than it was before the news. 
The source of uncertainty was arguably twofold.77 On the one hand, assets 
previously considered “stores of value” ceased to be good collateral because there 
was no conventional way to determine their value, and thus their prices fluctuated 
widely and unexpectedly. On the other hand, the scarcity of collateral brought 
counterparty uncertainty to the forefront, because suddenly, financial institutions 
became exposed to the failure of counterparties to make good on their promises. In 
what follows, I will try to show that these two effects are mutually reinforcing. 
Together, they may trigger liquidity spirals on broad classes of financial assets 
                                                          
 
74 Hellwig, supra note 42, at 170–72; Gorton, supra note 44, at 41.  
75 As late as on July 10, 2007, Chuck Prince—former CEO of Citigroup—famously stated: “When the 
music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, 
you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.” POSNER, supra note 3, at 88–89 (noting that the 
music had already stopped, but Prince had not realized it). 
76 Geanakoplos, supra note 41, at 104. 
77 In a similar vein, see Gorton & Metrick, supra note 59, at 446. 
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when the natural buyers are not financially constrained—at least, not initially. The 
reason why fire sales occur in this setting is not that nearly all institutions are so 
much leveraged that they are forced to sell in falling markets, but rather that 
financially unconstrained institutions are reluctant to buy temporarily troubled 
assets, because those institutions fear a liquidity shock from some remote 
counterparty. This hypothesis is being investigated theoretically by a few 
scholars.78 On the empirical side, there are two sets of problems. First, there is very 
little data available on wholesale funding markets. Second, because two main 
determinants of the demand for liquidity—rising counterparty risk and scarcity of 
collateral—change simultaneously, it is very difficult to disentangle what is 
causing what. Despite all these hurdles, it is worthwhile highlighting what the little 
data available suggests in this regard, at least in terms of correlations. 
After the first wave of panic in 2007, the Keynesian convention according to 
which high-grade securitized assets are good substitutes for cash was 
compromised. Securitization was no longer a way to generate safe collateral.79 
Under conventional uncertainty about whether, when, and on what terms private 
debt will be repaid in the future, the amount of collateral that can be traded “safely” 
for cash suddenly shrinks to a narrow definition of cash-equivalents (e.g. sovereign 
debt, which at that time was neither experiencing nor was expected to experience 
trouble). This is the first reason why collateral becomes scarce—supply falls. The 
second reason is that the demand for cash increases for purely precautionary 
reasons. Because there is a limit to the adjustment of collateral prices to changes in 
demand and supply (nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero),80 the scarcity of 
collateral exposes banks to an effective, but immeasurable risk of withdrawals 
either directly or via the default of counterparties. 
This phenomenon is an example of a self-fulfilling prophecy depending on 
the sudden scarcity of collateral. Before financially unconstrained institutions can 
profit from purchasing a few securities at fire sales prices, say the subprime MBS, 
                                                          
 
78 See Ricardo J. Caballero & Alp Simsek, Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 14997, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15479. See also 
Krishnamurthy, Amplification Mechanisms in Liquidity Crises, supra note 71, at 15–25. 
79 In passing, it is worth noting that something similar is happening in the Euro sovereign debt crisis. 
Public debt securities issued by some countries are no longer considered conventionally safe and thus 
they have lost liquidity, which is the main property of good collateral. See Peter Dattles et al., The 
Sovereign Debt Crisis—Shifting from a Bad to a Good Equilibrium, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, Apr. 2012, at 17–25. 
80 See ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 33, at 144 (discussing how liquidity trap situations—where 
intermediaries are “awash with cash” but are still reluctant to lend—can arise from this circumstance). 
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larger liquidity buffers need to be created to protect from unexpected withdrawals. 
At this point, the question is whether to borrow that liquidity or to directly invest in 
more liquid assets, such as cash. When liquidity is contemporaneously becoming 
more expensive relative to other assets, even financially unconstrained natural 
buyers of troubled assets may choose to first sell untroubled assets for liquidity. As 
a result, currently untroubled assets suddenly trade at a lower price because of a 
liquidity premium. And untroubled assets may become troubled later on, if for any 
reason the liquidity premium rises so much as to trigger fire sales. 
This theoretical sequence of events seems to be exactly what happened. The 
natural providers of liquidity, particularly in the United States, were the 
commercial banks that have access to relatively stable funding (insured deposits). 
There is evidence that U.S. commercial banks have ended up being net buyers of 
assets from financially constrained institutions (hedge funds and investment 
banks),81 but this has not prevented asset prices from falling. Most likely, U.S. 
commercial banks were simultaneously disengaging from unsecured interbank 
credit thereby making liquidity more expensive. Commercial banks were increasing 
their liquidity buffers by curtailing lending according to a general perception of 
rising counterparty risk. In secondary markets, this freezing of credit markets 
justifies a liquidity premium on every potentially illiquid asset so long as it is 
comparable to the cost for buyers to obtain cash for meeting unexpected 
withdrawals. 
With all the caveats previously made about causality, the data suggest that 
there may be some truth in this hypothesis. Figure 3 shows that the spreads on 
mortgage-unrelated securities effectively moved together with the cost of 
(unsecured) interbank lending. The latter is plotted as the difference between the 3-
month LIBOR and the spread on Overnight Index Swaps (OIS). Because the OIS 
spread takes out the expected impact of interest rate risk, the LIBOR-OIS can be 
considered as an indicator of counterparty risk among the major banks.82 In normal 
times, the LIBOR-OIS is just a few basis points. In August 2007, this indicator 
spiked at above 70 basis points and it subsequently increased with events 
worsening the counterparty risk (most notably, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008). 
                                                          
 
81 He, Khang & Krishnamurthy, supra note 71, at 136. 
82 For a more detailed discussion of why this is the case, at least empirically, see Gorton & Metrick, 
supra note 59, at 446–47. 
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It is noteworthy that the spreads on mortgage-unrelated assets, both corporate 
bonds and ABS, increased immediately with the cost of interbank funds.83 This 
circumstance suggests that banks curtailed lending immediately after the first wave 
of panic, which made liquidity more expensive and scarce, and induced some 
intermediaries to obtain precautionary liquidity more cheaply (at the margin) by 
selling assets. Causality could in principle run in the opposite direction,84 namely 
from illiquidity of the assets to counterparty risk. However, this is unlikely. If 
banks are not distressed, the only reason to sell assets at a loss is to obtain liquidity 
at a cost that is lower, not higher, than tapping the interbank funds. If banks have to 
sell assets because they are distressed (the “classic” fire sale scenario), they are 
caught in a liquidity spiral, and so their demand does not affect the cost of 
interbank funds—the banks do not get any such funds. In the last scenario, the 
assets spreads should be significantly higher than the cost of unsecured borrowing. 
As Figure 3 suggests, this might have happened, but only after the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers.85 
A similar dynamic of disengagement can be shown with respect to 
collateralized lending. In this context, withdrawal is operated via increasing 
haircuts: a 100% haircut means that the lender is unwilling to refinance the 
position. In normal times, haircuts reflect the expected volatility of the collateral 
regardless of the counterparty identity. Given the perceived safety of asset-backed 
securities, these haircuts were also very low before the crisis. Professors Gorton 
and Metrick report that they were zero in the most opaque repo markets.86 Table 1 
reports a broader information set from the International Monetary Fund’s Global 
Financial Stability Reports. 
                                                          
 
83 With respect to Figure 3, it is worth noting that the assets spreads are calculated with different 
maturities, all longer than three months. Therefore, only the difference in trends is significant. INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FIN. STABILITY REP. (Apr. 2009); INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FIN. 
STABILITY REP. (Apr. 2010). 
84 Krishnamurthy, Amplification Mechanisms in Liquidity Crises, supra note 71, at 15. 
85 The study of secondary markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers requires factoring in the effect 
of asset purchases by the government and central banks. This is beyond the scope of this inquiry. See 
He, Khang & Krishnamurthy, supra note 71, at 137–38. 
86 Gorton & Metrick, supra note 59, at 429.  
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Table 1 
Typical Haircuts on U.S. Repo Transactions 
 April 2007 August 2007 April 2008 August 2008 
U.S. Government 
bonds 
0.25 N/A 3 3 
Corporate bonds 
(investment-grade) 
0–3 0–3 8–12 8–12 
Corporate bonds 
(high-yield) 
10–15 10+ 25–40 25–40 
AAA CDOs 2–4 8–10 15 95–100 
BBB CDOs 10–20 50 40–70 95–100 
AAA ABS 3–5 8–10 N/A* 50–60 
* The reported figure of 10–20 for AAA MBS can be considered as an upper bound. 
Source: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT (October 2007; 
April & October 2008). 
The standard narrative about haircuts in the global financial crisis is that they 
rose reflecting the deterioration of the quality of the collateral, particularly of 
securitized assets. In other words, they rose because suddenly there was uncertainty 
on the price the underlying securities would fetch if the collateral had to be seized. 
Because lending is collateralized, counterparty risk is not supposed to matter. 
Despite the discontinuities in Table 1, this interpretation is apparently borne out by 
the data. But there is one circumstance suggesting that this might not be the whole 
story. Uncertainty about the quality of asset-backed securities kicked in at once 
when banks experienced the first wave of panic. The above interpretation implies 
that haircuts should also rise at once and remain almost at the same level until the 
uncertainty is resolved. However, Table 1 shows that haircuts increased very 
slowly even on the worse classes of assets. Perhaps the worst class of assets created 
from risky mortgages, the infamous Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs),87 was 
accepted as collateral until the failure of Lehman, when cash became very difficult 
                                                          
 
87 On the (obscure) logic behind the creation of CDOs, see Gorton, supra note 44, at 24–30. 
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to obtain across the board. Note that haircuts on corporate bonds increased too, but 
only in April 2008, despite these assets’ being interested by a downward price trend 
similar to that of subprime-unrelated ABS—albeit less severe—already since 
August 2007 (Figure 3). These dynamics suggests that there could be two factors, 
and not just one, behind increasing haircuts.88 The first is indeed the concern about 
the quality of collateral, which unambiguously increases the haircuts. The second 
factor is less straightforward. Liquidity could be drained independently from 
markets to intermediaries, in anticipation of future events that may make this 
liquidity very useful for profits or survival. The effect of this behavior on haircuts 
is ambiguous. 
It is well established that counterparty uncertainty became relevant precisely 
when the collateral became unreliable. This correlation is clear, but it is puzzling.89 
In addition, as mentioned, it is difficult to say what caused what in a situation of 
falling prices and of intermediaries scrambling for cash. However, the 
precautionary motive for liquidity provides one theoretical reason why the haircuts 
should be low (or increase less rapidly) when there is fear that counterparties may 
default of their obligations. The reason is that the borrower should be wary of the 
lender too. If the lender defaulted and failed to return a security worth more than 
the funding it guarantees, the borrower would lose the haircut. In a situation where 
banks tend to hoard cash in anticipation of future withdrawals, lenders disengage 
by requiring higher haircuts. Borrowers, however, may refuse to accept higher 
haircuts, particularly on the best classes of assets, and instead close their positions 
at a liquidity discount. This dynamic parallels the disengagement from 
uncollateralized borrowing and contributes to explaining the initially moderate 
falling of subprime-unrelated securities prices (as well as their haircuts). 
To appreciate the social waste implied by this behavior, let us consider an 
institution that is simultaneously both a borrower and a lender. A financially 
unconstrained bank protects from counterparty uncertainty by hoarding cash, which 
it can do by exiting the repo market in two ways. As a lender, the bank may require 
higher haircuts for fear that the price of collateral suddenly drops. As a borrower, 
the bank may deny any uncertain counterparty a haircut higher than the current 
liquidity discount and sell its best assets instead of borrowing against those assets. 
                                                          
 
88 In a similar vein, Krishnamurthy argues that illiquidity depends on both the unwillingness of 
institutions to purchase on volatile secondary markets and on their aversion to hold illiquid investments 
(finding supporting evidence of both behaviors). Krishnamurthy, How Debt Markets Have 
Malfunctioned in the Crisis, supra note 71, at 14. 
89 Gorton & Metrick, supra note 59, at 446. 
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In this way, the bank reduces its exposure to lenders by tapping liquidity at a price 
between the cost of secured and unsecured borrowing. This strategy only makes 
sense under the worst-case scenario in which both the lender defaults and the assets 
prices do not fall. In this scenario, however, the protection of higher haircuts on the 
other side of the balance sheet is unwarranted. Asset prices cannot fall and not fall 
at the same time. Protection against immeasurable counterparty uncertainty thus 
leads to waste of liquidity. This situation is but one example of inefficiency due to 
double or multiple counting of the impact of worst-case scenarios, emphasized by 
the “flight to quality” literature on the financial crisis.90 
It is worth noting that the above mechanism of haircut adjustments involves 
adverse selection too, but only at a later stage. The natural consequence of 
disengagement from repo finance in that fashion is that both the best borrowers and 
the best assets gradually exit the market. Once only bad borrowers and bad assets 
are left will the haircuts rise to a point where the market collapses under massive 
fire sales. According to one competing explanation of the crisis,91 adverse selection 
materialized immediately when the AAA ratings on asset-backed securities became 
unreliable. These securities suddenly became “information-sensitive,”92 triggering 
incentives to process information on how much they were actually worth. In this 
perspective, rising haircuts are explained as an attempt by the most sophisticated 
investors to recreate information-insensitivity, which is a necessary condition for 
the securities to be acceptable as collateral.93 
While I share the view that asset-backed securities became information-
sensitive upon the demise of their ratings, if not slightly earlier than that, I contend 
that uncertainty explains better than asymmetric information why information-
insensitivity could not be recreated. If haircuts have not adjusted immediately to a 
market level, possibly as high as to trigger immediate systemic collapse through 
liquidity spirals, it must have been because no financial institution could credibly 
commit to a floor on the securities prices. In other words, nobody knew enough 
                                                          
 
90 See Caballero & Krishnamurthy, supra note 40. See also Krishnamurthy, How Debt Markets Have 
Malfunctioned in the Crisis, supra note 71, at 12. 
91 GORTON, supra note 7, at 144–47. 
92 Id. at 112–13. See also Bengt Holmström, Discussion of “The Panic of 2007” by Gary Gorton 2 
(Oct. 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14358. 
93 See Tri Vi Dang, Gary Gorton & Bengt Holmström, Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises (Feb. 13, 
2012) (working paper), available at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/garygorton/documents/Paper_Ignorance 
_000.pdf. 
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about the future to establish a new Keynesian convention for pricing private debt 
securities. If this interpretation is correct, haircuts have been adjusting to worsening 
expectations on asset prices and counterparty defaults until they became so high to 
make these expectations self-fulfilling for certain assets and certain intermediaries. 
If asymmetric information could not start this process, it has most likely 
increased its severity.94 Institutions that could not hoard cash—for instance, 
because they were too heavily invested in MBS from the very beginning—were 
eventually caught in liquidity spirals that wiped out their equity. Forced sales are 
observable, and thus they are incompatible with the asymmetric information 
requirement of adverse selection. On the other hand, institutions that dumped 
healthy assets before being forced to do so were unlikely to deliberately suffer from 
adverse selection; more plausibly, they chose to sell in order to protect themselves 
from future withdrawals and from counterparty risk. In fact, a few classes of assets 
could be initially traded for cash at moderate liquidity discounts while mortgage-
related assets could only be sold at fire sale prices immediately after August 2007 
(compare Figure 2 with Figure 3). It looks like adverse selection kicked in 
dramatically only later on. After banks had disengaged from the least illiquid 
private assets in the quest for cash or cash-equivalents, the repo market could 
become a market for “lemons.”95 This allowed both the spreads and the haircuts to 
skyrocket as the model predicts.96 The increasing number of assets involved in fire 
sales would have driven all banks to bankruptcy, no matter how much cash they 
had managed to hoard, had the U.S. government and the Federal Reserve failed to 
prevent massive withdrawals from the banking system. 
C. Stopping a Liquidity Crisis: Limits and Potential of 
Monetary Policy 
Central banks reacted immediately. Already, in August 2007, they injected 
substantial amounts of cash via open market operations. Banks have been “awash 
with cash” since then.97 Where did this cash go? Obviously, in the only kind of 
assets that could still be exchanged promptly and safely for cash, mainly deposits at 
                                                          
 
94 Krishnamurthy also argues that both uncertainty and adverse selection played a role in the global 
financial crisis. Krishnamurthy, How Debt Markets Have Malfunctioned in the Crisis, supra note 71, at 
14. 
95 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 
Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
96 See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 59, at 443–46 (documenting these two effects in the repo market). 
97 ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 33, at 80. 
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the central bank and Treasury bonds. As Figure 4 shows, at the peaks of financial 
turmoil, investors did not mind earning on a Treasury bond nearly one percentage 
point less than the theoretical risk-free rate approximated by the OIS rate defined 
above. This preference for sovereign debt is evident in August 2007, and on the 
dates corresponding to the failure of Bear Stearns and Lehman. The negative 
spread of Treasury bonds from the OIS can be regarded as an indication of the 
price of cash: being a synthetic swap linked to monetary policy expectations, the 
OIS cannot be turned into cash, while a Treasury bond can. If both rates are risk 
free, the lower rate earned by a T-bond is suggestive of a liquidity premium. The 
size of the latter becomes all the more remarkable when our proxy for counterparty 
risk (LIBOR-OIS) is added. Both components skyrocketed after the U.S. 
government failed to rescue Lehman Brothers. But overall, banks hoarded more 
cash than the increasing fear of counterparty risk justified. As the more cash banks 
had, the more they hoarded, monetary policy became unable to control the money 
supply through open market operations.98 This is exactly what Minsky had 
predicted would happen in a banking crisis.99 
Figure 4 
Source: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT (April 
2010) and U.S. Treasury. 
                                                          
 
98 Id. at 145. 
99 MINSKY, supra note 34, at 280–82. 
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It took quite some time for the monetary authorities to realize what was 
happening and to take the necessary measures to restore confidence and bank 
lending. The mechanisms of liquidity crisis that I have described above do not 
match mainstream economic theory.100 However, they correspond with Minsky’s 
view on how a systemic crisis arises when Ponzi and speculative finance are no 
longer sustainable.101 The systemic breakdown simply depends on the banks’ 
inability to refinance their positions, which is a necessary condition for them to 
honor commitments to deliver cash on demand. Banks can only stay liquid as long 
as they are able to issue new debt. The reason why they lose this ability in a crisis 
is the general perception that the assets’ cash flows will not be sufficient to service 
their liabilities. This perception, which triggers the withdrawals, is not justified by 
anything else than our humble Keynesian expectations under uncertainty.102 As 
soon as one event disrupts the convention that a certain debt, e.g. AAA securities, 
will eventually be repaid by future income, banks are in trouble because they may 
be asked to deliver cash against securities that are no longer traded for the cash 
flow they promise. 
The event that triggers the switch of expectations is almost irrelevant. The 
unsustainable nature of subprime mortgages is a case in point. Drawing from their 
equity, banks could have possibly delivered cash against all subprime losses, with 
perhaps a few minor bankruptcies.103 But the banking system could not withstand 
the suspicion that virtually all classes of private debts were financed according to 
the same Ponzi scheme, requiring the placement of additional debt in a situation 
where households could barely repay those they already had. That suspicion was 
highly unlikely to be true. According to Minsky’s classification, banks engaging in 
maturity transformation perform mainly speculative finance in which the assets’ 
cash flows are more than sufficient to pay the interest on liabilities.104 Under 
reasonable conditions of risk diversification, this scheme only bears interest rate 
risk. Interest rates had been falling throughout the financial crisis.105 However, 
                                                          
 
100 But see PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET—HOW THE FED BECAME THE DEALER OF 
LAST RESORT (2011) (considering a similar approach and discussing how it departs from mainstream 
economics and finance). 
101 See supra text accompanying notes 34–35. 
102 See supra text accompanying notes 27–28. 
103 Hellwig, supra note 42, at 181–83. 
104 MINSKY, supra note 32, at 118–21. 
105 ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 33, at 144. 
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even the most conservative maturity transformation is exposed to the creditor’s 
uncertainty as to whether banks can roll over their debts. The gist of Ponzi finance 
is not in its size, but in the consequences of its existence. When it is uncovered and 
obviously proven to be unsustainable, the Keynesian assumption that “the existing 
state of affairs will continue indefinitely”106 cannot be maintained. This revelation 
adversely affects the confidence on other classes of debt regardless of how healthy 
they effectively are. 
When uncertainty kicks in, standard economic theory is unable to predict its 
developments. Most theoretical models use comparative statics and tractable 
measures of risk, which can capture some parts of the story at best. The paradox of 
uncertainty in a Minsky/Keynes framework is that, while the specific event that 
brings uncertainty to the forefront is unpredictable, the dynamics of its 
consequences follow a definite pattern. The only rational strategy when faced with 
uncertainty about future liquidity conditions is to hoard cash. From the perspective 
of banks, and investors in general, this strategy requires losing income in the hope 
of avoiding bankruptcy. From the perspective of society, carrying out this strategy 
is neither possible nor efficient. It is obviously not possible, because there is no 
way in which all debt can be liquidated at once. It is not efficient, because liquidity 
is actually not needed other than for precautionary reasons, and the lack of need is 
the reason why funds were committed to finance in the first place. The only impact 
of cash hoarding on society is destruction of value through liquidity spirals, banks’ 
bankruptcies, and credit crunches. This impact does not happen immediately as the 
system does not have a sufficiently large stock of stores of value to absorb the 
dumping of private debt. Private debt thus trades at a liquidity discount or not at all, 
which keeps the banking system on the verge of insolvency until cash hoarding 
makes income and prices fall so much as to determine a debt-deflation.107 At that 
point, all debt must be restructured and the financial system has effectively failed. 
This perspective somehow simplifies the question of what should be done to 
avoid the collapse. Withdrawals must be stopped, and the only way to do it—other 
than prohibiting them altogether, which would consolidate rather than resolve 
uncertainty—is to support the classes of private debts on which banks draw their 
commitments to deliver cash on demand. The only economic actor that can do this 
                                                          
 
106 KEYNES, supra note 6, at 99. 
107 The mechanism of debt deflation was first identified by Irving Fisher, The Debt-Deflation Theory of 
Great Depressions, 1 ECONOMETRICA 337 (1933). For an illustration, see ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 
33, at 136–42. 
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is the state, more precisely the central bank.108 Taking the perspective of society, 
the central bank can avoid waste of liquidity nurtured by individual fears of the 
unknown.109 
Central banks do not know better than individual agents what the future will 
hold. But central banks do have two comparative advantages. First, they can net out 
the impact of aggregate withdrawals on different counterparties.110 Second, they 
can issue virtually unlimited quantities of money,111 which will not have 
inflationary consequences as long as cash is hoarded. To be sure, printing money to 
reduce the burden of debt redistributes wealth from creditors to debtors, which may 
adversely affect the recovery.112 But this wealth redistribution is a purely 
theoretical scenario, as central banks’ willingness to purchase private debt does not 
need to result in a physical exchange for cash unless there are actual withdrawals. 
As liquidity is sought for only for precautionary reasons, the central banks’ 
commitment to provide cash when needed will suffice to stop the withdrawals. The 
United States’ private debt crisis was actually stopped in this fashion, although 
governments and monetary authorities understood the mechanism too late to avoid 
issuing money and public debt for actual bailouts, with negative impacts on the 
sustainability of governments’ finance.113 
Of course, ex-post public intervention has adverse consequences on private 
choice ex-ante. Resolving uncertainty is a great thing, but it brings back to the 
forefront all the incentive problems (moral hazard, excessive leverage, adverse 
selection) that may not have played a central role in the global financial crisis, but 
will likely lead to another financial crisis in the future. However, the key message 
of Keynes/Minsky’s theory of financial instability is not that we should forget 
about incentives. The core of this theory is that liquidity problems are endogenous, 
because they depend on the private creation of money by maturity transformation, 
which is in turn the essence of banking business and the source of its profits. The 
                                                          
 
108 The views on this surprisingly converge across different schools of thought. Compare MINSKY, supra 
note 34, at 358–65; GORTON, supra note 7, at 183; with Caballero & Kurlat, supra note 16, at 28–30.  
109 Ricardo J. Caballero, Crisis and Reform: Managing Systemic Risk, MIT ECONOMICS, 11–12 
(Mar. 31, 2010), http://economics.mit.edu/files/5614. 
110 Jean C. Rochet, Regulating Systemic Institutions, 22 FINNISH ECON. PAPERS 35 (2009). 
111 Krishnamurthy, Amplification Mechanisms in Liquidity Crises, supra note 71, at 27.  
112 Tirole, supra note 4, at 317–20. 
113 For an excellent overview of this problem and of its consequences on global imbalances in the 
current accounts of the balance of payments, see ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 33, at 238–65. 
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study of banks’ (and bankers’) incentives must then start from this fundamental 
insight. Understanding the factors determining banks’ exposure to uncertainty is a 
necessary condition for public intervention to cope with uncertainty in an 
incentive-compatible fashion. 
IV. BANKING, CENTRAL BANKING, AND THE ROLE OF 
REGULATION 
Regulators cannot predict how exactly banks will engage in creation of 
private money. However, we know that they will do it and why. Banks maximize 
profits in two ways: by increasing the maturity mismatch between long-term assets 
and cheaper short-term liabilities and by increasing the size of their balance sheet. 
Leverage and liquidity are therefore two sides of the same coin.114 Moreover, the 
development of conventions upon which liabilities can be safely exchanged for 
cash progressively eases the constraints of both leverage and liquidity on a bank’s 
viability. Over time, holders of short-term liabilities allow banks to carry out more 
maturity transformation and to issue more debt given their equity. This 
transformation happens under two loose conditions: a period of financial stability 
that is supposed to “continue indefinitely,”115 and a financial innovation that, in the 
conventional absence of uncertainty, promises to deliver cash today against an 
arbitrarily long horizon of future cashflows. Securitization and the use of its output 
in the repo market illustrate how this transformation happened the last time. But, 
this example does not tell anything about how it can happen again, save that it will 
happen again under the same loose conditions. 
It would be a mistake to explain this pattern as mere greed. I spoke of banks 
in abstract, but I should rather refer to banking. As Minsky argued,116 it is not 
difficult to create money; the difficulty is to get it accepted. Contrary to a diffuse 
opinion, banks have no exclusive right to create money; neither do governments 
and central banks—with one exception that I will discuss shortly. Once the 
convention is established that a certain class of assets can be exchanged for cash on 
demand, virtually anybody having access to these assets can perform maturity 
transformation—that is, create money—on a scale commensurate to the equity 
necessary to guarantee investors against underperformance of a diversified 
portfolio. If the assets already represent a diversified portfolio, as in the case of 
                                                          
 
114 Adrian & Shin, supra note 12, at 607–11. 
115 KEYNES, supra note 6, at 99. 
116 MINSKY, supra note 34, at 255. See also GORTON, supra note 7, at 155. 
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ABS, the equity requirements (the haircuts) will be lower. This phenomenon 
explains the growth of shadow banking. If we think of shadow banking as a 
competitor of traditional banking,117 banks could not avoid engaging in shadow 
banking through appropriate techniques and vehicles reducing their capital charges; 
shareholders would have gradually moved away from banks otherwise. In addition, 
shadow banking could offer investors returns higher than traditional deposits under 
the same conditions of withdrawal on demand. The faith of investors in shadow 
banking explains how maturity transformation could increase through issuance of 
more and riskier long-term debt (e.g. subprime mortgages) exactly when the equity 
of financial institutions was shrinking. Not greed, but competition drives the 
mechanism.118 
Competition and (financial) innovation are hardly bad things. At least in a 
dynamic perspective, they can be reconciled. However, in financial intermediation, 
the combination of these factors with the conventional dismissal of uncertainty can 
lead to disaster. Take securitization as an example. It powerfully slices risk, can 
create relatively safe stores of value via a seniority mechanism, and provides credit 
to units that previously had little access to credit. What is the “safe” amount of cash 
promises that can be drawn on a securitization? Nobody knows. It depends on the 
conventions upon which risk assessment is performed. Whatever financial 
institution performs banking (henceforth, for simplicity, banks) will, under 
competitive pressure, stretch these conventions as to make more classes of assets 
acceptable for short-term funding, thereby profiting from money creation, but 
increasing the amount of Ponzi finance behind it. Promises to exchange assets for 
cash can only be honored by issuing more debt. Eventually, this cycle will have to 
stop. The problem is that it can only stop dramatically. Either the convention is 
accepted—and then all debt will be repaid in a stable infinite horizon; or it is 
rejected—but then only short finite horizons are considered, in which long-term 
debt cannot be repaid. 
It may be tempting to simply let banks bear the consequences of their reliance 
on conventions. But the fact is that uncertainty cannot be handled otherwise, and 
when it kicks in upon the demise of conventions, it affects all banks and the entire 
economy regardless of how conservative agents have been with their indebtedness. 
In other words, there are externalities from banking and uncertainty makes those 
                                                          
 
117 Hellwig, supra note 42, at 151–53.  
118 GORTON, supra note 7, at 164–67. 
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externalities unavoidable.119 For this reason, monetary authorities must always back 
up privately created money and commit to honoring the cash promises that banks 
are unable to meet. In a sense, this financial backstop has always been in place, 
even before the institution of central banks. Think of the private clearinghouse in 
the Free-Banking era.120 The important advantage of central banks is that they can 
issue a kind of money endorsed by the government, which, albeit at the cost of 
redistributing real resources from creditors to debtors,121 is acceptable under any 
state of nature including a debt-deflation. As I said, this costly advantage does not 
need to be actually used when central banks are aware of how banks create money 
and commit in advance to discounting the underlying assets on predefined terms. 
To this purpose, central banks should know in advance on which kind of assets 
financial intermediaries perform maturity transformation, even without being able 
to second-guess the conventions that make this transformation possible. 
By no means should central banks allow any kind of maturity transformation. 
If banks were permitted unfettered maturity transformation, moral hazard would 
become unmanageable. Banks could in principle promise to deliver cash on any 
kind and maturity of private debt, which would make commitments of both central 
and private banks not credible. Instead, the policy implication of this approach 
amounts to little more than what the Federal Reserve actually did in the global 
financial crisis. That is, the central bank should identify the classes of private debt 
that are mispriced because of cash hoarding, and it should refinance only these 
assets as opposed to formerly liquid assets that cannot be expected to deliver the 
promised cash flows under the current state of nature.122 The only difference is that 
this commitment should be undertaken ex-ante, not ex-post, when any delay makes 
uncertainty worse and more costly to handle. It is a difficult exercise, but at least in 
principle, it can be performed in the following fashion. 
The central bank should announce periodically its willingness to discount 
private assets at different rates and haircuts. The rates should be fixed under a zero-
profit condition for banks. The haircuts should reflect the worst-case scenario 
expectations about each asset’s risk of default for different maturities of funding. 
Based on Minsky’s classification,123 assets supporting hedge finance should carry 
                                                          
 
119 Heremans & Pacces, supra note 9, at 571–75. 
120 For a historical discussion of that experience, see GORTON, supra note 7, at 28–37. 
121 Tirole, supra note 4, at 318. 
122 See ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 33, at 151–57 (discussing the Fed policy of “quantitative easing”). 
123 See supra text accompanying notes 34–35. 
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little, if any, haircut, at least on the shortest maturities. The haircuts on speculative-
finance assets should be higher and related to the interest rate risk. Finally, the 
haircuts on Ponzi-finance assets should be as high as the difference between the 
expected cash flows to maturity and the current value of principal and interests. In 
this way, the central bank bears almost no risk on the positions made during 
turmoil, provided that the turmoil comes to an end. For the turmoil to end, position-
making by the central bank must be credible. Credibility will hold under three 
conditions. First, haircuts need to remain constant at the levels announced before 
the turmoil begins, no matter how badly funding conditions deteriorate. Second, 
every eligible bank should have access to discount so long as its capital is sufficient 
to maintain the haircuts; after that point, the bank would be bankrupt and the 
central banks should discount the creditors’ claims on the bank’s assets under the 
same rule. Third, positions should not be marked to market at least until the turmoil 
is ended. 
This solution, which parallels Minsky’s proposals on how central banks 
should perform their lender of last resort function,124 needs more elaboration than 
can be afforded here.125 Intuitively, the proposal implies two things. First, the 
central bank only sets a lower limit on the contraction of private money supply in 
the event of a crisis. Private haircuts and refinancing rates will never exceed the 
levels set by the central bank, and they will always be lower in normal times. 
Second, lending of last resort is made sufficiently penalizing for the banks, as they 
would be allowed to make no profits on the discounted assets precisely when the 
reminder of their balance sheet is generating losses. In this perspective, the most 
binding constraint on the safety of banking is that they need to have enough equity 
capital to meet the haircuts in order to avoid going bankrupt. The proposal only 
prevents the bank’s equity from being wiped out by rising haircuts. Otherwise, it 
gives the central bank (or the creditors, or the government, depending on the 
winding-up procedures) a call option on the private bank’s equity.126 This option 
                                                          
 
124 See MINSKY, supra note 34, at 279–82. 
125 It is worth noting that the proposed approach would cope with one major problem with the 
implementation of lending of last resort in panic situations: the stigma effect and its potentially 
disruptive consequences on the perceived solvability of banks borrowing from the discount window. 
This is because borrowing from the discount window against hedge-finance assets would be 
institutionalized along the lines identified by GOODHART, supra note 45, at 70–74, perhaps making only 
more penalizing borrowing anonymous. This approach also reflects the recommendation by MINSKY, 
supra note 34, at 362, to control private money supply through the discount window, although it does 
not rule out open market operations for targeting interest rates and policing inflation. 
126 For an analysis of bankruptcy based on options theory, see NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPULOS, 
PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 234–43 (2005). 
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would be exercised when the bank turns out to be invested in more troubled assets 
than its equity can insure. 
One additional step is necessary in order to keep banks’ moral hazard under 
control. Under the proposed configuration of the safety net, a bank may still carry 
maturity transformation with too little equity, because its creditors know that its 
money-like liabilities will be honored by the central bank until the equity is 
effectively wiped out by the losses and the haircuts. Because creditors will not 
demand a risk premium for the part of the downturn that is to be absorbed by the 
safety net, ultimately taxpayers will have to pay the bill. In addition, operating 
under such a safety net would still allow for bank runs accounting for the difference 
between the central bank backstop and the level of private market haircuts before 
the crisis begins. The regulation of bank capital is then necessary not only to 
prevent moral hazard, but also for reasons of externalities. This need for oversight 
is not new, as the matter lies at the heart of the regulatory debate. However, the 
dynamics of uncertainty bring in two important policy implications also as far as 
capital regulation is concerned. 
First, there is no point of countering regulatory arbitrage on capital adequacy. 
The private sector will always be faster than regulators in developing innovations 
that allow carrying maturity transformation with increasing leverage.127 This is a 
strong argument against the growing complication of capital adequacy regulation, 
as under Basel II and its prospective overhaul under the Basel III approach.128 A 
simpler lower bound on the capital/asset ratio—which, to be sure, is being studied 
as a part of the Basel III framework129—is more difficult to game, especially when 
the quality of bank’s assets is being monitored by the central bank for lender of last 
resort purposes. More importantly, banking should be defined functionally as any 
kind of financial intermediation involving maturity transformation.130 Any 
intermediary issuing short-term liabilities should be deemed a bank unless there is 
no mismatch with its assets (for instance because their liquidity is guaranteed by a 
bank). Only the leverage of banks according to this definition should be regulated. 
In exchange for this regulation, only banks would have access to lender of last 
                                                          
 
127 See GORTON, supra note 7, at 170–73. 
128 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (Dec. 2010, rev. June 2011), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. 
129 Id. at 4. 
130 See Pacces, supra note 11, at 506–07. 
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resort facilities, whereas all the other intermediaries should be allowed to fail 
regardless of the size of their balance sheet.  
The second implication is more interesting. A bank’s capital performs two 
functions.131 It is a buffer against unexpected loss; and it gives shareholder an 
incentive to avoid excessive risk-taking. Under uncertainty, these functions must be 
reinterpreted. The buffer function is easily undermined by the growth dynamics of 
a bank’s assets under the conventional view that debts can be increasingly rolled 
over at a profit. When these profits are capitalized as retained earnings, the buffer 
shrinks over time. In times of crisis, the buffer becomes effectively a haircut on the 
bank’s unsecured debt that must be relaxed in order to allow the bank to meet its 
obligations. This problem is known as pro-cyclicality of capital adequacy 
regulation, and it is exacerbated by uncertainty.132 However, the endogenous 
dynamics of a bank’s instability provides a solution.133 Retained earnings should 
indeed be capitalized, but they should not be counted in the capital/asset restriction 
on a bank’s balance sheet. The advantage of this solution over the countercyclical 
buffer included in Basel III is that a cushion of safety based on retained earnings 
would be both specific to the individual bank and less prone to error or capture of 
the supervisory authority. 
The obligation to build up a buffer from retained earnings also serves a 
purpose in regards to incentives. It prevents shareholders as a group from cashing 
in the profits of meeting uncertainty in good times while externalizing the effects of 
this uncertainty on society in bad times. To be sure, individual shareholders do not 
need dividends to cash in their stock returns: they can just sell the shares. As 
Keynes recognized, liquidity of stock markets is a necessary evil of equity finance. 
Restricting the payout ratio of banking companies, as advocated by Minsky to 
improve bank shareholders’ incentives, may be therefore insufficient to constrain 
immeasurable risk-taking by shareholders and managers because, by definition, 
immeasurable risk-taking is not incorporated in stock prices. 
                                                          
 
131 Hellwig, supra note 42, at 193. 
132 MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
31–37 (2009). 
133 See MINSKY, supra note 32, at 356–57 (advocating regulation of banks’ retained earnings for 
purposes of buffer and, more importantly, of incentives). 
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V. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS 
According to Keynes,134 the liquidity of stock markets is most unfortunate. It 
allows shareholders to renegotiate continuously their commitments to equity 
capital. Because shareholders do this mainly for reason of speculation, the 
corporate valuation is often detached from fundamentals. Rather, it reflects the 
speculators’ expectations on how investors will value the stock in the near future. 
These expectations are based on the assumption that the state of affairs will 
continue indefinitely, unless there is a specific reason to expect a change. In 
general, this implies that stock prices are affected by short-termism, a fact that 
supporters of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis have been unable to 
falsify.135 In banking, this implies that the value of a speculation business (maturity 
transformation) is determined in turn by speculation on its short-term profits. Even 
if regulation restricts the payout ratio of banking companies to make shareholders 
internalize the effects of future unexpected illiquidity, the bank’s equity may still 
be overvalued by markets because of immeasurable risk-taking—that is, embarking 
upon Knightian uncertainty. This point, however, is only relevant for financial 
regulation if overvalued equity affects the decision of bank managers to engage in 
socially excessive maturity transformation. 
It is not immediately clear why this should be the case. In principle, bankers 
have much to lose from embarking on uncertainty. If bankers are lucky—that is, so 
long as existing conventions are maintained—they will eventually get rich. But 
when things go wrong—and it will happen eventually—bankers will be personally 
ruined unless they have already become rich enough to diversify their wealth. In 
more technical terms, managers are naturally risk- (and uncertainty-) averse.136 
Now look at the banks’ shareholders. The shareholders can always cash in their 
returns in a boom whereas they are bound to lose only a portion of their wealth in a 
bust. Therefore, shareholders are the ones who want to load on uncertainty. So 
shareholders seek to counter managerial risk aversion. They can do it by 
threatening to fire those managers who underperform relative to their competitors. 
In exchange for that, managers contract for a compensation scheme allowing them 
                                                          
 
134 KEYNES, supra note 6, at 98. 
135 For a discussion of the implications of the ECMH on corporate governance, see Bratton & Wachter, 
supra note 20, at 688–96. 
136 Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Roell, Corporate Law and Governance, in HANDBOOK OF LAW 
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to cash in short-term returns through bonuses and stock option plans. These 
compensation schemes allow managers to then diversify their wealth. 
If that was the end of the story, prohibiting banks from increasing the size of 
their balance sheet via retained earnings (while constraining the distribution of the 
latter)would suffice to prevent bankers and shareholders as a group from cashing in 
the proceeds of uncertainty, eventually at the expenses of society. This perspective, 
however, neglects the role of Keynesian speculators. Under a convention that—
given the bank’s equity—all debt created can be exchanged for cash, speculators 
may still reward banks engaging in excessive maturity transformation. This 
speculation will occur because the impact of a liquidity crisis on the bank’s equity 
and retained earnings will only materialize in some future state of the world 
unaccounted for by the existing convention. On the other hand, the existing 
convention bears out the immediate profits of maturity transformation. Note that 
this effect is amplified when the bank can increase its Return on Equity by levering 
on retained earnings, and it becomes extreme in the presence of moral hazard. 
However, the tendency of stock markets to reward strategies disregarding future 
uncertainty (as well as its externalities to society) would hold true also under the 
regulatory constraints introduced in the previous section, which in principle 
disallow both capitalizing retained earnings and moral hazard. 
Speculation can affect bankers’ behavior in two ways. The first is the impact 
of large shareholders, who do not participate in speculation but whose portfolio 
returns are affected by it. Those shareholders can replace an underperforming 
management.137 The second channel is pay-per-performance, which gives bankers 
themselves an incentive to behave like speculators, cashing in the short-term profits 
of meeting uncertainty while leaving the shareholders in the cold when uncertainty 
turns out badly.138 The first hypothesis implies that managers’ incentives are 
effectively aligned with the interest of long-term investors; in other words, 
corporate governance—at least how we understand it—has no bearing on financial 
instability. Bankers engaging in excessive maturity transformation with excessive 
leverage are simply acting in the best interest of their shareholders, whose 
expectations fail to factor in the effects of uncertainty on their own wealth and on 
the wealth of society. Whether the problem is externalities, moral hazard, or both, it 
should be tackled by regulation of banking, not by banks’ corporate governance. 
                                                          
 
137 Id. at 853. 
138 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 20, at 714–15 (hypothesizing, however, a straight departure from the 
ECMH for this to happen). 
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On the contrary, under the second hypothesis, corporate governance is part of the 
problem because bankers engage in more immeasurable risk-taking (Knightian 
uncertainty) than shareholders would want given banking regulation. This strategy 
imposes prospective losses on both shareholders and the society with the sole 
purpose to increase managerial remuneration. 
The hypothesis of managerial opportunism has received more credit in the 
policy debate.139 The preference for this hypothesis is understandable, as it seems 
that bankers have been the only winners of the global financial crisis. Bankers 
could take home substantial bonuses and gains from stock options just before the 
losses of the banks they had managed hit shareholders, taxpayers, and society at 
large.140 However, what bankers actually cashed in does not say much about their 
incentives to take more immeasurable risk than it would be optimal for 
shareholders. What matters is whether they cashed in as much as they could, 
because only this circumstance could validate the suspicion that bankers knew 
better than shareholders what was going to happen. This proposition is not borne 
out by the empirical evidence. As shown by Fahlenbrach and Stulz,141 bankers 
rather chose to increasingly tie their destiny to that of shareholders, as they 
reinvested (and lost) significant parts of their remuneration in the banks’ stock. The 
authoritative proposals to backload bankers’ remuneration and to increase 
shareholders’ voice in its determination,142 both of which were ultimately adopted 
in the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act,143 are difficult to reconcile with this evidence. It looks 
like such measures will either increase the cost of bank management or decrease its 
quality, without affecting banks’ stability.144 
                                                          
 
139 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 3, at 98–99; ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 33, at 68–72.  
140 This view has been vigorously aired by Professor Bebchuk and his co-authors in a series of recent 
articles. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure: Executive 
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Stat. 1376–2223 (2010). 
144 See Steven N. Kaplan, Should Banker Pay Be Regulated?, 6 THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE (Dec. 2009).  
I L L I Q U I D I T Y  A N D  F I N A N C I A L  C R I S I S   
 
P A G E  |  4 2 5   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2013.260 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
The hypothesis that bankers’ incentives were instead aligned with the interest 
of shareholders enjoys more empirical support. It seems that the bankers whose 
incentives were better aligned with shareholders’ interest performed worse in the 
crisis. This conclusion is supported on several grounds. Managerial ownership,145 
the number of independent directors,146 and a standard index of shareholder-
friendliness,147 are all negatively associated with bank performance during the 
crisis. However, the same indicators of incentive alignment are positively 
associated with bank performance before the crisis. It seems then that shareholders 
fell in love with the profits of securitized banking, which they regretted when the 
crisis unexpectedly hit.148 It is hard to see how this outcome could be improved by 
supplying bankers with longer-term incentives. Although, as I mentioned, very 
authoritative scholars advocate this,149 one should take into account that even the 
banks normally credited with a long-term orientation have failed in the global 
financial crisis. There is no evidence that banks with concentrated ownership in 
continental Europe have outperformed those with diffuse ownership in the U.S. and 
the U.K.,150 while some studies even show the opposite.151 
It is thus tempting to conclude that corporate governance had nothing to do 
with the global financial crisis. Under the conventional view of corporate 
governance according to which managers (the agents) are supposed to act in the 
best interest of shareholders (the principal) however far this interest is from that of 
society at large, the only plausible conclusion is that corporate governance played 
no role in the crisis. However, let us try to look at the matter in more abstract terms. 
Assume that, in the aftermath of a financial crisis, a credible safety net is 
established together with an incentive-compatible banking regulation, for instance 
along the lines sketched out in the previous section. Under this assumption, 
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146 See Renee Adams, Governance and the Financial Crisis (Univ. of New South Wales; Fin. Research 
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shareholders would now care to maximize profits minus the expected losses from 
illiquidity that will not be avoided by the safety net. In other words, for the moment 
I am assuming there is no moral hazard. The question would then be the following: 
after regulation has managed to have banks’ externalities internalized by banks’ 
shareholders, can the corporate governance of banks undermine this result? 
The answer is a qualified yes, which calls for some regulatory intervention in 
the contract between shareholders and bank managers. Under the above 
hypothetical scenario, initially we would expect shareholders to ask bank managers 
to share in the prospective losses from illiquidity even if these losses materialize 
after they are gone. Bankers, on the other hand, will likely ask something in 
exchange of such a claw-back provision. This can be either a higher fixed 
compensation or tenure, in the absence of which the best bankers would rather go 
work somewhere else: for instance, a hedge fund. The reason why tenure matters 
for bankers is that the norm of prudent banking is a very fragile convention that 
only holds in the aftermath of a crisis. Eventually, it will be replaced by another 
convention, namely that creating money out of long-term debt in some new fashion 
is again “safe.” This convention will in turn induce shareholders to overlook future 
losses from illiquidity. At that point, an untenured manager would be exposed to 
short-termist pressure independently of any claw-back provision. The manager will 
have to take some immeasurable risk or be replaced by somebody else willing to do 
it. Because either way the claw-back would make the manager bear prospective 
losses from illiquidity, she would rather keep her job and manage to the bullish 
market. This effect is avoided if bankers accepting the claw-back provisions are 
tenured or can be compensated for the value of their tenure, for instance through a 
golden parachute.152 
Tenure and golden parachutes efficiently protect bankers from stock-market 
speculation because they commit shareholders to refraining from putting short-term 
pressure on managers. Of course, this solution allows managers to extract higher 
private benefits of control. I leave the general discussion on whether this outcome 
is good or bad for corporate governance for another time.153 Intuitively, however, 
                                                          
 
152 According to a general model of severance payments, ex-post compensation in the form of a golden 
parachute commits shareholders to tolerating moderate underperformance, in which case compensating 
tenure is cheaper than the higher fixed salary demanded by a manager that can be replaced at will. See 
Andres Almazan & Javier Suarez, Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures, 
58 J. FIN. 519 (2003). 
153 Alessio M. Pacces, Control Matters: Law and Economics of Private Benefits of Control (European 
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 131, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1448164. 
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the extraction of private benefits should be less harmful in banking than in other 
businesses because managers’ inclination to enjoy “free cash flow” when they are 
insulated from hostile takeovers turns out to be beneficial for society in a liquidity 
crisis.154 The crucial point, however, is that this solution needs to be supported by 
regulation. 
First, the claw-back provisions cannot be left to shareholders’ choice as in the 
previous example in which moral hazard was assumed away for convenience. 
Shareholders may well endorse claw-backs in the aftermath of a financial crisis, but 
their commitment would not be robust to changes in the stock market’s 
expectations. Claw-backs will disappear from the market as soon as speculators 
return bullish about the profit potential of banking. Because stock markets can be 
short-termist, claw-backs must be imposed by regulation.155 However, the rationale 
here is not to align managerial incentives with shareholders’ interest, but rather to 
draw a wedge between these. 
Secondly, regulation should support bankers’ tenure. Managerial tenure is not 
in line with the general attitude of policymakers, which rather support shareholder 
empowerment vis-à-vis the management. This approach should change with the 
purpose of enabling long-term commitments of shareholders as opposed to their 
short-termism fueled by speculation. Shareholders should have free choice about 
whether to give bankers tenure and for how long, or rather pay them a higher salary 
in return of the pay-per-performance mandatory claw-back. Regulation should just 
be enabling on this point, namely neither mandate nor prohibit bankers’ tenure. 
Thirdly, regulation should allow golden parachutes freely, instead of 
restricting them as it is inclined to do.156 Particularly, any amount contracted for 
replacing a manager before her term is expired should not fall within the scope of 
the claw-back provision unless the latter has been already triggered. Shareholders 
who, under pressure by speculators, want a new management to take more 
immeasurable risk should pay for that upfront. Conversely, shareholders who 
already suffered losses because of the current management’s dealing with 
uncertainty should be able to claim back the bankers’ gains whether they decide to 
replace them or not. 
                                                          
 
154 For the illustration of how entrenched managers tend to waste free cash flow, see Michael C. Jensen, 
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).  
155 Albeit timidly, Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to achieve this outcome. See Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1903 (2010). 
156 See id. at § 951, 124 Stat. at 1891 (subjecting severance payments to shareholders’ say-on-pay). 
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A similar approach—namely, insulation of bank control from stock market 
speculation—should govern the regulation of banks having a controlling 
shareholder. In this context, claw-backs are not necessary, unless the controlling 
shareholder is directly involved in the management (in which case, the same rules 
as above should apply). Differently from a manager on a pay-per-performance 
scheme, a controlling shareholder naturally bears the long-term consequences of 
her actions, including the choice to take immeasurable risk. A controlling 
shareholder cannot exit her investment unless she gives up control, so at least in 
principle she should be insensitive to speculation. Then, the question is why banks 
with a controlling shareholder have performed as bad, and possibly worse, than 
banks under managerial control? 
There is probably more than one answer to this question, but one plausible 
conjecture is that controlling shareholders are not as insensitive to speculation as 
standard theory suggests. The investment of a controlling shareholder has an 
opportunity cost, which is given by the return on the same investment as a 
diversified portfolio. This opportunity cost increases when the bank’s stock returns 
decrease relative to alternative investments, which is the case when speculation 
induces other banks and firms in general to take more risk. A good reason for a 
controlling shareholder to forego these higher returns is private benefits of control. 
This hypothesis does not seem to be supported by the empirical evidence: all 
proxies for the presence of private benefits of control have no significant impact on 
banks’ risk-taking before the crisis.157 However, this applies only to indicators of 
measurable risk, which surprisingly, are associated with worse pre-crisis returns 
and better performance post-crisis. According to the uncertainty approach 
developed in this article, the stock market was instead rewarding immeasurable 
risk-taking by the bank in the buildup of the crisis. The empirical studies carried 
out so far do not refute this hypothesis. If the hypothesis is true, controlling 
shareholders could have foregone the market reward of immeasurable risk-taking if 
they were able to appropriate likewise immeasurable private benefits of control. 
Elsewhere, I have characterized these as idiosyncratic private benefits of control, 
including the individual satisfaction of controlling a successful enterprise supported 
by the ability to claim a control premium in exchange for this satisfaction.158 
Safeguarding these benefits can be a good reason for controlling shareholders to be 
insensitive to speculation and short-termism. 
                                                          
 
157 Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 20, at 14–15. 
158 See Pacces, supra note 153.  
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In one empirical analysis discussed earlier,159 proxies of outside shareholder 
control—which is conventionally considered good governance—are positively 
associated with the pre-crisis stock returns, but negatively associated with the post-
crisis performance of banks. Now, consider the position of a controlling 
shareholder who wants to steer clear from a conventional policy of high 
indebtedness and extreme maturity transformation, but has to deal with outside 
investors empowered by “good” corporate governance. Such a controlling 
shareholder would have to fight constantly with a board that is strong by 
assumption; she would eventually lose support by her financiers; and she would be 
most probably derided by her peers. This situation would hardly compensate the 
money lost under her unconventional view of the uncertainty ahead. For one, she 
might be wrong in choosing the debt to steer clear from or in predicting a systemic 
crisis that will not happen soon. Even if she is eventually right, she will not regain 
the support of shareholders and financiers who opposed her. As Keynes put it, “it is 
better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”160 
The anecdotal evidence on hedge fund controllers who shorted the subprime 
business confirms this hypothesis. All they earned was ingratitude and withdrawals 
from the investors they had just made rich.161 
One way for a bank’s controller to oppose the conventional safety of 
immeasurable risk-taking is to threaten appropriation of immeasurable private 
benefits of control. For this strategy to be credible, the controlling shareholder must 
be always in the position to leave for an arbitrarily large control premium. It is 
normally believed that in this situation control hardly ever changes hands.162 But, 
this conclusion is unwarranted when the opportunity costs of control are factored. 
The incumbent controller cannot credibly ask more than the stock valuation under 
her unconventional view of uncertainty, which would be by definition lower than 
the conventional valuation based on more immeasurable risk-taking. So, the control 
transaction will eventually take place depending on the relative robustness of the 
incumbent’s and the insurgent’s expectations. Of course, we do not know ex-ante 
which expectations are right (the optimist’s or the pessimist’s), but that does not 
matter. What matters is that insurgents and incumbents pay and receive the price 
for what they believe is the future value. The only condition for such a control 
                                                          
 
159 Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 20, at 12.  
160 KEYNES, supra note 6, at 102. 
161 See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT—INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).  
162 See, e.g., Becht, Bolton & Roell, supra note 136, at 851–52. 
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transaction not to result in higher externalities of banking is that, however the 
takeover is implemented, retained earnings can increase neither the size of the 
bank’s balance sheet nor its payout ratio, as argued in the previous section. 
Unfortunately, takeover regulation often stands in the way of such 
transactions by placing restrictions on the controller’s ability to claim a control 
premium. One prominent example is the European Takeover Directive,163 whose 
mandatory bid prevents controlling shareholders larger than 30% from selling their 
shares at a premium over non-controlling stock. Such restrictions should be 
removed, or at least waived for banks. This waiver would be the companion of 
allowing bank managers to contract for tenure and severance payments in exchange 
for mandatory claw-back provisions. If we consider that claw-backs aim to make 
bank managers behave more like block-holders than like speculators,164 the logic of 
lifting both kinds of restrictions is identical: to avoid that bankers become victims 
of speculators under any ownership structure. Paradoxically, restrictions on control 
premiums are present in Europe,165 where the majority of banks have concentrated 
ownership, whereas the Dodd-Frank Act has introduced “say-on-pay” restrictions 
on golden parachutes in the U.S.,166 where virtually all banks have dispersed 
ownership. I hope to have demonstrated that these regulations are a mistake. All 
restrictions on the ability of controlling shareholders and managers to sell bank 
control for a premium should be lifted. Once again, shareholders who want bankers 
to take more immeasurable risk should pay for that upfront. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I have presented an alternative approach to financial crises based on 
uncertainty as conceptualized by Knight,167 developed in a theory of long-term 
expectations by Keynes,168 and applied to banking by Minsky.169 This perspective 
                                                          
 
163 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament of the Council of 21 Apr. 2004 on Takeover Bids, 
2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 [hereinafter Takeover Bids Directive]. 
164 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 20, at 724–26. 
165 Takeover Bids Directive, supra note 163, at art. 5 (prescribing the mandatory bid). 
166 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1891 (2010). 
167 KNIGHT, supra note 5. 
168 KEYNES, supra note 6. 
169 MINSKY, supra note 32. 
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reveals how banks perform maturity transformation by conventionally disregarding 
uncertainty about future liquidity conditions, which eventually undermines 
acceptance of the private money they create and determines systemic liquidity 
crises. This approach explains better than others the unfolding of the global 
financial crisis, the behavior of banks, and the role of regulation and central banks. 
Compared to other formalized models of uncertainty in financial crises,170 the 
dynamic approach of this article fills one important gap in the theoretical literature. 
Not only does it explain why banks hoard cash in bad times, it also describes the 
dynamics of uncertainty in good times, when private substitutes for cash are 
created in the first place through increasing maturity transformation. The 
formalization of the complex dynamics of construction and subsequent dismissal of 
conventions to handle uncertainty, first identified by Keynes, is an issue for future 
research. 
It may be asked why creation of private money should be allowed at all. 
Under slightly different behavioral assumptions, one recent model shows that the 
supply of private money is inefficient as it results in the generation of false 
substitutes of safe cash.171 This thesis stands in sharp contrast with evolutionary 
theories of banking,172 which show how also historically creation of bank money is 
endogenous to competition and growth. The present study endorses the view, 
accepted by Keynes too, that the private supply of liquidity is an unavoidable 
consequence of capitalism. Besides, as the more recent crises of sovereign debts 
demonstrate, there are no “true” or “false” substitutes of cash under structural 
conditions of uncertainty. 
The approach of this article shares the conclusion of others that private 
incentives tend to generate excessive supply of bank money because of 
externalities.173 Hence, the ability of financial intermediaries to engage in maturity 
transformation should be constrained by regulation. However, it is even more 
important that monetary authorities monitor and back up private money because 
failure to do so undermines the efficacy of monetary policy and can lead to 
financial meltdown. Following Minsky, this article contends that the supply of 
private money should be disciplined by an adaptive configuration of the lender of 
                                                          
 
170 See, e.g., Caballero & Simsek, supra note 78. 
171 Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and 
Financial Fragility, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 452 (2012).  
172 MINSKY, supra note 32, at 249–82; GORTON, supra note 7, at 38–59. 
173 See Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation, 127 Q.J. ECON. 57 (2012). 
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last resort function of central banks and by imposing a strict counter-cyclical 
capital/asset ratio on the balance sheet capacity of all intermediaries issuing 
money-like liabilities—that is, banking as functionally defined. It is worth 
mentioning in passing that this approach has important points of tangency with the 
current debate on the sovereign debt crisis of the Eurozone.  
The global financial crisis has been sometimes popularized as “the Minsky 
moment.”174 Had Hyman Minsky still been alive, he would have probably credited 
this to Keynes. However, in one key aspect Minsky’s theory of financial instability 
departed from that of Keynes: the role of equity markets. According to Keynes, 
liquidity of stock markets is most unfortunate because it conditions managerial 
decision-making to the conventional expectations of speculators. When applied to 
banks, this approach has one important implication for corporate governance. 
Managerial claw-backs or the ownership structure appear to foster long-term 
orientations in bank management only to a limited extent. In booms, bankers will 
always tend to cater to the short-termism of stock markets—unless they have tenure 
and the possibility to trade private benefits of control for compensation. If these 
options are allowed, prudent managers are likely to negotiate them in exchange for 
mandatory claw-backs. Under this regime, short-termist shareholders would have 
to pay upfront for replacing a prudent manager or controller, for embarking in more 
immeasurable risk-taking, and possibly for externalizing part of the consequences 
to society. Therefore, regulatory restrictions on golden parachutes and control 
premiums should be removed. 
                                                          
 
174 ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 33, at 91. See also GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL 
CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS, CREDIT BUBBLES AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET FALLACY (2008). 
